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The recent death of Edward Said has reignited the 
debate as to whether his landmark work Orientalism 
still has something to teach us about the study of 
Arab-Islamic civilization, In this artide, I will argue 
that Said's central thesis in Orientalism has a direct 
explanatory role to play in our understanding of the 
work produced in at least one area of scholarship about 
the Arab and Islamic worlds, namely Arab~IsIamic 
philosophy from the dassical or medieva.1 period. 
Moreover. I will claim that it continues to play this 
role not only for scholarship produced in the West by 
Western scholars but also within the Arab world itself 
After recalling some traditional varieties of Oriental-
ism in the study of Islamic philosophy, I will go on 
to isolate some neo-Orientalist theses and positions. 
Then I will identify what I call 'oriental Oriental ism' 
in the study of Islamic philosophy, which originates in 
the Arab world itself, In conclusion, I will speculate 
as to why Orientalism persists in scholarship about 
the Islamic world, more than a quarter of a century 
after Said first unmasked it Finally, I will distinguish 
two accounts of Said's interpretive stance and attempt 
to justify a particular reading of his philosophical 
framework, 
Traditional Orientalism 
Traditional Orientalism is not di~'t1cult to find among 
the first European scholars who studied Islamic phil-
osophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, It 
can be summarized in the form of a few salient theses 
that were prevalent among such scholars as Ernest. 
Renan, TJ. de Boer, w.G, Tennemann, and others, For 
the sake of brevity, I will omline three. 
Renan is well known for having consid.ered the 
fslamic philosophical corpus as entirely derivative of 
Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. Thc view held by 
him and others was that Islamic philosophy was Greek 
philosophy in Arabic letters, As he put it: 'This phil-
osophywas written in Arabic. because this idiom had 
be(.~omc the learned and sacred language of all Muslim 
countries~ that is all.'! 1n Rcnan's view, although the 
Arabsirnparted a national character to their religious 
creations. poetry, architecture and theological sects, 
they showed little originality in philoS(}phy, Indeed, 
'The true Arab genius, characterized by the poet.ry 
of the Kasidas and the eloquence of the Qur'an, is 
absolutely antithetical to Greek philosophy:' Rather, 
Greek philosophy was introduced to Arab-Islamic 
civilization thanks to a combination of Persian and 
Syrian Christian initiative. TJ. De Boer expresses a 
similar viewpoint in The History (~l Philosoph)' in 
Islanl: 
Oriental Wisdom. Astrology and Cosmology de~ 
livered over to Muslim thinkers material of mHny 
kinds. but the Form, the formative principle, came 
to them from the Greeks. In every case where 
it is not mere enumeration or chance ("oncatena-
tion that is taken in hand, but where an attempt, is 
made to arrange the Manifold according to positive 
or logical pOJnts of view, we may conclude with 
all probability that Greek influences have been at 
work.:! 
Among these early students of Islamic philosophy 
in the West, departures from Greek philosophy we,re 
often considered misunderstandings rather than iImo~ 
vations; they even attributed to Islamic philosophers a 
failure to understand the Greeks. rather than ('on sider 
that they might harbour different views from their 
illustrious predecessors. Moreover, this attitude took 
on a racial dimension in Renan, as when he contrasted 
Aryan rationalism with Semitic religious sensibjlity, 
charging that. the Arabs are inherently incapable of 
producing original philosophy and have inherited what. 
rational ity they have from the Aryan Greeks, 
Though not absent in recent Western scholarship, 
thi.s attitude is less common among scholars writing 
in the twentieth century, Still, clear traces remain. 
To cite just one example, E.U, Rosenthal claims that 
I 
the reason F:irabI views democracy more favourably 
than Plato .is that he has mi.ssed the irony implicit i.11 
Socrates' mock praise of democracy. The possibility 
that FarlibT holds different views from Plat() on inde-
pendent grounds is scarcely even considered. In fact. 
when Rosenthal allows himself to speculate that Farabr 
may have differed fmm Pl ato, he holds that 'tt is not 
impossible' thal' he has taken his views from Aristotle 
- despit.e the fact that Aristotlets Politics was almost 
certainly not known in the Islamic world during the 
classical period, and never reached these philosophers' 
Apparently, even a nonexistent Greek text is a more 
likely source of ideas than the creative faculties of the 
Islamic philosophers themselves. 
Another early Orientalist thesis is that philosophy 
held a marginal place in Islamic culture as a whole, 
and was restricted to a small group of el ite free-
thinkers. Some scholars who admit the originality of 
these thjnkers nevertheless maintain that their innova -
tive contributions were largely disregarded since they 
never went further than a minuscule audience. Renan 
is again the IOCUJ classicus: 'The philosophers in Islam 
were isolated men, ill regarded, and persecuted .. :.5 The 
claim is sometimes supported by the esotericism of 
the lslamic philosophers themselves, since the major 
figures in the tradition clearly he.ld thm their views 
and doctrines should be revealed only to a class of 
intellectuals who alone could grasp their subtleties 
and abstruse deductive- arguments. But one should not 
take this as an indication of the actual influence of 
philosophical ideas, since their indirect impact took 
many forms. First, numerous Arabic terms were coined 
expressly to denote philosophical concepts, includ-
ing such llbiqu_itous terms as kamryyah (quantity). 
ka}:/Iyyah (quality), wu;tld (existence), dhal (essence), 
jawhar (substance). and so on. Second, given the seam-
less links between philosophy and natural science, 
including medicine - which was firmly grounded in 
notions of form "uld matter, the four clements, sub-
stance, ~~ssencc and accident M .. , philosophical doctrines 
and theories penetrated the culture at large thanks to 
the centrality of medical theory and ptact"' •. Third, 
many establ ishment figures in Islamic history for-
mulated their mainstream attitudes, at least in part, 
in react ion to the views of the philosophers. Such 
central thinkers as al-Ash'arT, al-Gh.zall, 'Ibn J:!azm, 
al-Shahrastan!, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldon 
frequently occupied themselves in responding to the 
philosophers, in the process borrowing their ,'ontepts 
and inheriting their problematic. Finally, philosophical 
views OIl such matters as the best tbrm of government, 
Ihe relation between faith and reason, and the nature 
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of God, among others, were often taken up without 
acknowledgement. 
A third thesis prevalent among traditional Ori-
entalists is that philosophy .in [slam was dominated 
by the struggle between revelation and reason, and 
obsessed with the dichotomy of intellect (caql), on 
the one hand, and tradition or revelation (naq/), on 
the other. This feeds into the conception of Islamic 
philosophy as a ddensive enterprise, embattled and 
encircled, rather than one that fashioned its own intel -
lectual space. This amorphous thesis is bard to refute 
briefly, but anyone with a passing acquaintance with 
the content of Arab-Islamic philosophy will know 
that there is much more to this diverse tradit.ion than 
a cultural war with orthodoxy. These philosophers did 
not see themselves as involved in a struggle as much 
as in an atrempt to exam ine the relationship between 
revelation and reason. an enterprise they of [en shared 
with the theologians - despite their differences of 
opinion . Moreover, it is not even accurate to say 
that the theologians were uniformly more literalist nr 
orthodox than the philosophers, as the philosophers 
themselves were often at pains to point out.6 To the 
extent that the problematic of intellect and revelation 
did figure in the work of the Islamic philosophers, it 
did so no more than in medieval Christian philosophy, 
or indeed in early modern European philosophy. One 
need look no further than the 'Letter of Dedication ' 
to Descartes' MeditaTions for a vivid impression of 
the fragile tension between the theologians and phil-
osophers in seventec11Ih-century France? 
A more recent twist. to the traditional Orienta list 
tendency in the study of Islamic philosophy is provided 
by the work of Henry Corbin. Corbin opposes the 
three theses that I have identified as being distinctive 
of tradi tional Orient.list interpretations of Islamic 
philosophy: its alleged derivativeness, margina lity, 
nnd conflict with religion. But he continues to view 
Islamic philosophy as monolithic and essentially dif-
ferent from Western philosophy. Moreover, like some 
of the traditional Orientalists I have discussed, he links 
the 'essence' of Islamic philosophy to certain ethnic 
characteristics and cu lturaJly uniform traits. Corbin 
concurs with Renan in regarding the genius of the 
Muslims as residing primarily in the spiritual rather 
than the rational realm,S But rather than conclude that 
Islamic philosophy is therefore unoriginal, he takes 
the spiritual dimension as its defining characteristic, 
setting it apart from other philosophical traditions: 
'In Islam, above all, the history of philosophy and the 
history of spirituality are inseparable:' More impor-
tantly, he regards this allegedly dominant spiritual ten-
dency as a positive attribute, valorizing i. and setting 
it up as the main contribution of Islamic philosophy. 
For him, Islamic philosophy represents a system of 
thought dominated by mysticism, a critique of rational· 
ism, and an attempt to transcend the logi.c.1 methods 
inherited from the Greeks. Corbin also characterizes 
th is philosophy as 'Oriental philosophy'. trading on 
the ambiguity in the Arabic adjective ishraqi (which 
is usually translated as 'ilIuminationisC rather Ihan 
'eastern' or ·Oriental ' ). 
Therefore, although Corbin dissents from traditional 
Orientalists in that he regards Islamic philosophy as 
being original. he concurs with them in considering 
it to be essentially different in nature from \Vestern 
philosophy, and in holding that it is stamped by the 
ethnic character of the thinkers who were instrumental 
in its development (in his case, Persians not Arabs). 
Corbin writes that Islamic philosophy .is fundamentally 
a prophetic philosophy: 'A prophetic philosophy pre· 
supposes a type of thought which does not allow itself 
to be bound either by the historical past. .. , or by the 
limits imposed by the resources and laws of rational 
Logic:'o In addition, this type of philosophy is esoteric 
and its 'esoteric meaning is not something one can 
construct with the support of Logic or a battery of syl· 
logisms'.l1 Moreover, he insists: 'The significance and 
continuance of philosophical meditation in Islam can 
be truly grasped only so long as we do not attempt to 
see it, at any price, as the exact equjvaJent of what we 
in the West have for our part called "philosophy" over 
the last few centuries:12 Though Corbin v.iews Islamic 
philosophy positively, his interpretation distorts it by 
portraying it as ex.elusively mystical and anti-rationalist 
in nature, and represents it as being essentially alien 
and difficuh to communicate to outsiders ,1) 
Neo-Orientalism 
These views, at' least in their ext.reme versions, have 
declined in prominence, but there is another attitude, 
very much in the spirit of Orientalism, that cont inues 
to play a central role in the study of Islamic phil· 
osophy. Though it may not appear overtly Orientalist in 
character, and may indeed seem opposed to (raditional 
Orientalism, the net result of this a.ttitude is to al ienatc 
and exoticize Islamic philosophy and to downplay its 
role as philosophy. 
Before describing the trend I have in mind, I wi ll 
distinguish it from another tendency wi1h which it is 
sometimes confused. Some scholars proceed from the 
notion that philosophy in the Islamic world was so per· 
secuted that the outward meaning of the text remains 
hidden and can only be divined through a dose reading 
.-. ----_ .. __ ._-_ . 
by experts. Oliver Leaman seems to regard this as 
the pre-eminent manifestation of Orientalism in the 
clirrent study of Islamic philosophy, attribut.ing it to 
Leo Strauss and his followers. As Leaman puts it: 
The assumption is that Is'Jamie philosophy shou'ld 
not be regarded as philosophy primarily, but more 
as a code which needs to be cracked in order to 
discover Ihe opinions of the philosophers. It is seen 
as a form of literature which disguises the- real opin-
ions of its writers. and it is the job of the interpreter 
to find out what these real opinions are, to pierce 
the layers of conceahlH:.',nt and uncover the genuine 
beliefs of the author." 
Leaman regards this as 'Orientalism at its worst', 
adding that , 
It implies that the philosophers in the Islamic world 
could not really be thought of as philosophers just 
like philosophers everywhere eise, but should be 
r~gardcd as capable only of a less.er and inferior 
activity, using philosophicnl Janguage to present 
unoriginal views in convoluted ways. 15 
But it seems to me that this misunderstands the intent 
of Straussianism. Although the Straussi.n mode of 
interpretation that Leaman criticizes gjves rise to a n 
overly narrow view of ls.1amic philosophy and has 
often led to gross distortions, it is only fai r to add 
that the method is typically applied across the board. 
That is to say, Straussians read Farab! in this manner 
no less than Plato or Machiavelli. This makes it dif· 
ficult to maintain that their method of interpretation 
is particularly Orientalist in character, since Strauss 
and his followers regard persecution to be a hallmark 
of all philosophical writing and consider philosophy 
to be engaged in a constanr struggle with religion , in 
Christendom and the Islam ic world alike. As such, 
they claim that philosophers in both traditions needed 
to hide thei r true views, which can only be d,iscerned 
by rcading between the lines and divining what these 
philosophers were really trying to say. In short, it 
does 110t seem useful to characterize (In attitude as 
Orienta list if it is equally applicable to the Occident. 
At best, the attitude is Orientalist in practice because 
in the case of Islamic philosophy this method is more 
widespread and is applied to the exclusion of others. 
At one point, the Straussian mode of interpretation was 
dominant among those who studied Islamic philosophy 
in the United States. This meant that this became by 
far the most common way of reading these texts in the 
West, which led ultimately to an exoticization of the 
texts. The overall effect of the dominance of Strauss's 
method when it came to Islamic philosophy may have 
led to a kind of Oriental ism in practice, even though 
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the intention of the Straussians was to apply their 
mel hod to all philosophical writi ng. Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that Slrauss and his followers did not see 
the Islamic philosophers as different in this respect 
from non·Islamic philosophers. 
There is another, more pervas ive, tendency than the 
Straussian one among scholars of Islamic philosophy, 
which .is more properly Oriemalist in charaelef. 
Although related 10 the attitude Ihat Leaman identi fies, 
it .i s imporlantly distinct from it; indeed, many of its 
practitioners are staunch opponents of StraussianisITL 
There is a prevalent predisposition among those who 
study medieval Islamic philosophy today to regard 
their fi eld of scholarship as an exercise in editing 
and comparing manuscripts . ascertaining their order 
of composition, paraphrasing texts, tracing lines of 
influence, and so on. Although such scholarly work is 
important and shou ld not be neglected, it cannot be a 
substitute for the more substantive endeavour of critical 
engagement with the texts. And engagement means 
reading the texts as works of philosophy: assessing 
the ir arguments, uncovering their underlying assump-
tions. and understanding their overall projects. That is 
not to say that one school of reading should dominate 
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in the interprelation of Islamic philosophy, but those 
who study it ought to engage in the kind of interpretive 
e nterprise that one, fi nds in other areas of the history 
of philosophy. To be sure, there is no broad consensus 
today on what the method of history of philosophy 
ought to be when it comes to the Western tradition. 
But what character.izes most works of scholarship 
in the history of philosophy is a serious attempt to 
assess the intellectual strengths and weaknesses of 
Ihe tex ts. Such work is conspicuously absent in the 
contemporary study of the history of Islamic phil· 
osophy. Strictly speaking, what passes for SCholarship 
in Islamic philosophy today is usually neither what 
one would consider history of philosophy, nor indeed 
what is thought of as intellectual history. That is to say, 
there is also little attempt to reconstruct the historical 
context of these texts , t.o situate them ,in their i nte1 ~ 
lectual milieux. to relate them to the social , political 
and religious debates of their time. and so on. 
Interesti ngly. some of the most prominent contem-
pOr'dry stude-nls of Islamic philosophy have dillgnosed 
this problem lucidly. but do not appear to have taken 
the steps necessary to overcome it. For example, 
Muhsin Mahdi wriles: 
One of the strangest criticisms that continues to be 
made by some of the representatives of the o lder, 
historical , and philological tradition of Islamic 
studies in the \Vest has to do with the va lidity 
of at!.empts to think or rethink the t.houghts of a 
philosopher such as Alfarabi, Avicenna, or Aver-
roes. This means that one can treat'. their thought 
historically, biographically, sociologically, and 
so forth - Ihat is good scholarship. BUL to think 
philosophically when dealing with the works of 
these phiJosophcrs, that is sa id nOI to be scientific. 
This v iew makes no sense of c,oufse. 16 
After saying thaI the 'concentrated analytical 
and interpretive ethos' is lacking in the study 
of hlamic philosophy, Mahd i adds that when 
he began seriously studying Islamic philosophy, 
'This seemed to me to be the task of the neW 
generation of students who occupy Ihemselves 
with Islamic philosophy: they must start with 
understanding the predicament in which they find 
Ihemselves and figure a way out: 17 But he never 
explains why ' the new generation of students' 
did not in fact carry this oul. Similarly, Dimitri 
Gutas, a scholar who represents an opposing camp 
among scholars of Islamic philosophy, issues an 
indictment of 'Arabist historians of philosophy' 
who have failed ' lO present the results of Iheir 
research. first, to historians of philosophy in a 
... 
systematic and rationalized way that will exploit the 
common points of reference and contact, and second, 
to their colleagues in Arabic and Islamic studies in a 
way that will make manifest the relevance of Arabic 
philosophy to Islamic intellectual life in gcneraL'lB 
Again. Gutas puts his finger on the problem. but does 
not hazard an explanation as to why thjs task has not 
been undertaken. Both scholars. central figures in the 
contemporary study of Arab-Islarnic philosophy. seem 
to shift onto others the burden of initiating a change 
in the way the subject is studied. 
Although both Mahdi and Outas are surprisingly 
silent on what makes their discipline unwilling to 
engage with the philosophical content of the texts under 
StUdY1 we can speculate as to why the unphilosophical 
manner of interpretation continues to dominat.e in the 
study of fslamic philosophy. The main impediment to 
philosophical engagement with these texts is the fact 
that Islamic philosophy is generally not studied in 
departments of philosophy in the West. Those who are 
engaged in studying it are either trained outside phil-
osophy departments. or. if not. are employed outside 
them. Many (if not most) have appointments in depart-
ments of Middle Eastern (or Near Eastern) languages. 
This reduces the opportunity, either in their research 
or teaching, to engage with these texts as philosophical 
texts. Mon.~over, for the student who wants to special-
ize in medieval Islamic philosophy in the West today, 
it is almost impossible to do so within a department 
of philosophy. This presents formidable institutional 
obstacles to a philosophical examination of the works 
of med.icval Islamic philosophy and goes a long way 
to explaining why such forms of scholarly engage-
ment are conspicuously absent:. Indeed. it also shows 
why, despite their keen awareness of the problem, 
Mahdi and Outas do not themselves appear to take 
the necessary steps to address it One should not leave: 
the impression that every single piece of scholarship 
on Islamic philosophy has this character; indeed. one 
could cite notable exceptions to this attitude, But it 
does suggest that serious structural impediments make 
it difficult to get around the prevailing tendency that I 
have identified as 'neo-Orientalist'. 
While these scholars identify the problem and 
characterize it accurate1y, other writers seem to miss 
the point entirely in describjng the Orientalist tendency 
in studying Islamic philosophy. In an article on 'Oricn-
talism and Islamic philosophy' in a standard reference 
work, Ubai Nouruddin criticizes Western scholars 
'who arc morc interested in finding something new in 
the Islamic sciences than in attempting to understand 
the transmis.sion of the corpus of human knowledge 
from one people to another'. I. Nouruddin adds that 
some scholars 'expend much effort in finding faults 
within the Islamic philosophical system. rather than 
using their impressive abilities to develop a better 
understanding of the amalgamation and legacy that 
have been left by the Islamic philosophers.' Needless 
to say, exclusive attention to "understand[ing] the trans-
mission of knowledge' and 'understanding the legacy 
left by the Islamic philosophers' is closely related to 
what I have been characterizing as the neo-Orientalist 
attitude. which is interested merely in tracing lines of 
influence and producing reverential paraphrases. By 
contrast, a thoroughgoing assessment of what is 'new 
in the Islamic sciences' and an objective examination 
of the 'faults' of Islamic philosophical theories would 
indeed bc closer to the critical practice of the history 
of philosophy. 
The fact that Islamic philosophy is studied neither 
as history of philosophy nor as intellectual history 
has led to its being viewed as a col1ection of ossifIed 
artefacts of a bygone civjlization rather than as a set of 
ideas that are worth engaging with intellectually. The 
effect of this dominant, mainly philological. tendency 
is Orientalist t()r two main reasons. The first. is that it 
regards Islamic philosophy as essentially different from 
Western philosophy. in that it is not worthy of active 
philosophical appraisal and evaluation. Though many 
of the practitioners of this type of reading seem to 
think that they are doing their subject matter It favour 
by treating it with such reverence - as though they dare 
not intrude upon the philosophers' arguments - the 
outcome is to exoticize and alienate the texts, Another 
reason that this t.endency is Orienta list in character is 
that it leaves the impression that Islamic philosophy, 
more so than Western philosophy. is inaccessible to 
a wider public and can only be read and studied by 
those who have the requisite mastery of a number of 
languages, religious traditions, and so on. This. in 
turn. is partly responsible for the continued exclusion 
of Islamic philosophy from the Western canon. 
Oriental Orientalism 
Some recent work on Islamic philosophy by Arab-
Islamic writers can also be classified as OrientaHst, 
despite the apparent oddity of applying the label to 
thinkers from the 'Orient'. which is why I am calling 
it 'orient.al OrientaHsm'. The main proponent of this 
attitude is the Moroccan scholar Mul)ammad 'Abid 
al-Jabia (Mohammed 'Abed al-Jabri), whose influ-
ential writings on the so-called 'Arab mind' have 
generated considerable debate in the Arab world and 
also received some attention in the West.2H One tinds 
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in labirf's work a thoroughgoing reductionism that 
considers what he calls 'Arab reason' to be a unified 
wbole whose only mode of thought is the 'analogy of 
the unknown aiter the known' (qiyt/s al-ghi:J 'ib 'ala 
al-shi:Jhid) .21 J~birl writes: 
This irrespon.sible practice of analogy has become 
the invariable element (the constant) that regu-
lates the movements within the structure of Arab 
reason. This eJement stops time, suspends evolu ~ 
fion and creates a permanent presence of the past 
inside the game of thought and inside the affective 
domain. thus feeding the present with ready-made 
Solulions.22 
This move to reduce an entire intellectual tradition to 
a single manner of reasoning. which is stagnant and 
inert by natUJe. is strongly reminiscent of Oriental ism 
of a traditional sort, and JabirT does lillIe to dispel this 
initial imprcssion_ He supports his reductionist thesis 
by saying that 'theoretical thinking in a given society 
at a given lime constitutes a particular unity endowed 
with its own armature inside of which the different' 
movements and tendencies blend in, so to speak:2.1 But 
despite his attempt to justify this thesis by saying that 
a similar kind of unity of thought could be attributed 
to, say, Greek philosophy, Jabir! regards Islamic phil-
osophy to be inferior to Western philosophy in its static 
and inert characte,f. He puts this quite unequivocally; 
'10 other words, what we call "Islamic philosophy" did 
not enjoy a continual and renewed reading of its own 
history like Greek philosophy or like Ihe European 
philosophy from Descartes until now:" Though he 
acknowledges thaI Arab-Islamic thought in the realm 
of science did evolve and produce innovations, he 
claims that these a.dvances in the sciences did not have 
an impact on philosophy. 
Explicit discussions of the 'Arab mind' or the 'struc-
ture of Arab reason' are nowadays somewhat rare 'in 
serious Western scholarship - despite the persistence 
of such assumptions in political consciousness and in 
popular discourse. Therefore one is dismayed to find 
these phrases so casually deployed by a contemporary 
Arab thinker with such weak justification. But Jabiri's 
oriental Orientalism goes further, in at least two ways. 
Firsl , his readings of classical Is lamic philosophy are 
concerned only with what he calls its 'ideological 
content' 10 the exclusion of its 'cognitive content'. By 
his own admission, he has no interest in the arguments 
and theories of these philosophers, but is rather focused 
on 'the ideological funclion (socio-pol.itical) to which 
the author or aUlhors of this thought subordinate thc 
cognitive material!2s JabirT is not only dismissing the 
substance of Islamic philosophy in favour of its alleged 
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socio-political role, he is also attributing a similar 
view to these philosophers themselves, name.ly that the 
substance of their work is unimportant compared [0 the 
socio-political function Ihat they wanted it to perform. 
Indeed. the cognitive material contained in these texts 
is, according to him, highly repetitive and not innova-
tive in the leas!.'· Echoing traditional OrientaJism, he 
wriles: 'All the Muslim philosophers' creative activity 
centred around one problematics, which is usually 
referred to as the problematics of 'reconciling reason 
and transmission:" He regards philosophy primarily 
as a 'mi I itant ideological discourse' dedicated to the 
service of science and defending rationalism against 
a kind of irrationalist religious traditi.onalism.:!!! For 
reasons that seem to have more to do with contem· 
porary polemics in the Arab world and debates with 
proponellls of political Islam, JabirT relegates the entire 
Islamic philosophical corpus to a single ideological 
function, 
A second aspect of Jobin's reading, which is quite 
literal.1y Orientalist in character, is the claim that there 
is a split among Islamic philosophers between those 
in the Eastern provinces, whose work was dominated 
by a kind of anti-Tatlonalist mysticism, and those 
from the Western regions, who exemplify progressive 
rarionaJism and are the most effective representatives 
of Ihe 'militant ideological discourse' that he favours. 
On his account, the split occurred as a result of 
the contributions of Ibn STill! (Avicenlla): ' With his 
Eastern philosophy~ Avicenna consecrated a sp'irituaJ-
ist and gnostic trend whose impact was inslrumental 
in the regression of Arab thinking from all open 
rationalism .. . to a pernicious irrationalism: 29 That 
was the fate of philosophy in the East, but. luckily 
rationaHsm asserted itself in the Islamic West. accord-
ing to Jabirr.30 He speculates as to why the West 
became rationalist while the East stagnated in a kind 
of irrational philosophizing, but the explanation rests 
on a facile reading of the relationship between phil-
osophy and science.3 ! Not surprisingly, the chauvinism 
thaI emerges in }fibir!'s privileging of the Arab-Islamic 
West over the inferior East has met with a degree 
of resistance in some discussions of his work in the 
Arab world, and his response has been unrepentanl. 
In some instances. j t has served merely to exacerbate 
the problem: 
I wish thaI: all those who accuse me of being preju-
d,iced [fa '{I,y_yub. chauvinism] in favour of the ra-
tionalist \Vest and against the mystical East (as they 
put it) would recognize that Ibn SIn:l" with whose 
philosophy I said, and repeat, Ibn Rushd made a 
break, is himself from Ihe 'far east ' , from Bukhara. 
, 
the land of the Persians. He [Ibn Slna], the gnostic 
physician aI·Rilzl, and al-GhalaIr all belong to an 
'east' that lies far beyond the area that extends from 
the [Atlantic] Ocean to the [Persian] Gulf, whose 
beating heart is: Egy pt." 
This response is more incriminating than Jabirf's 
original attempt to distinguish West from East, in 
that it seeks refuge jn a kind of ethnocentrism that 
pits Arabs against Persians, insinuating that the ethnic 
origins of Ibn Srnil, Ghazalr and al-RazI were respon-
sible for their alleged irrationalism. This is quite 
literally an Orientalist reading of Islamic philosophy, 
since it defines an 'Orient' within the Orient, whos.e 
borders lie somewhere to the east of Mesopotamia. We 
have come full cit'de back to the cultural essentialism 
of traditional Orientalism, but unlike Renan, J.birT 
attributes to Persians rather than Semites an incapac-
ity for logical thought, and unlike Corbin he does not 
view this allegedly Persian irrationalism in a positive 
light. 
labirr's reading of Arab-Islamic philosophy is lit-
erally Orienta list both in attributing the deadening 
influence on Islamic philosophy to Persia and central 
Asia, and in a more extended sense: namely, in its 
reversion to a one~dirncnsjonal view of Islamic phil-
osophy as being incapable of evolving and as fulfilling 
a single ideological function. Ironically, JabirT himself 
accuses an earlier generation of Arab scholars of being 
insufficiently critical of Ol'icntalism in the study of 
Islamic philosophy, but his critique is often bizarrely 
anachronistic and ultimately misses the mark. He 
berates MU~lafa 'Abd al-Raziq and IbrahTm Madkar, 
Egyptian scholars writing in the 1930s and 1940s, for 
lack of sensitivity to the concept of 'Orientalism' as it 
is currently used, without ever acknowledging the fact 
they were writing several decades before Edward Said 
published Orientalisrn (1978). Although Said's name 
goes unmentioned in Jabirf's essay, he accuses these 
scholars of not going far enough in criticizing Oriental-
ist readings of Islamic philosophy. He charges that they 
stilI talk in terms of reinserting Islamic philosophy 
into the Western tradition, rather than showing it as 
surpassing medieval Latin philosophy." Presumably, 
it surpasses it only in terms of its ideological content 
rat.hqr than its cognitive content - since he elsewhere 
regards all medieval philosophy as of a piece.'" 
Yet rather than trying to demonstrate that Islamic 
philosophy is somehow superior, we would be well 
advised to take a leaf from the work of the earlier 
generation of Arab scholars whom JabirI excoriates, 
Their call to reinsert Islamic philosophy into the 
Western canon serves as a refreshing reminder that 
what we term the 'West' is more shot through with 
external influences than conventional taxonomies 
would have us believe." As Edward Said observed in 
Culture and imperialism, we all need to situate our 
history and tradition in a 'geogmphy of other identities. 
peoples, cultures, and then to study how, despite their 
differences, they have always overlapped one another, 
through unhierarchicaI in.fluence. crossing, incorpo-
ration, recollection, deliberate forgetfulness, and of 
course~ conflict: 'The fact is', he concludes, 'that 
we arc mixed in with one another in ways that most 
national systems of education have not dreamed Of.'36 
The hybridity of the Western philosophical tradition 
and its interpenetration with Islamic philosophy is a 
more useful interpretive framework than the antago-
nistic one that JabirI espouses. 
Bacon or Foucault? 
I have outlined three genres of Orienta list interpreta-
tion of Islamic philosophy: a traditional sort dominant 
in the heyday of Orientalism, a more covert variety that 
continues to prevail in the study ofIslamic philosophy 
today, and a home-grown version that is manifest .in 
the work of at least one contemporary Arab scholar. 
In doing so, I have argued that the latter two modes 
of interpretation arc genuinely Orientalist in Edward 
Said's original sense, in regarding Islamic philosophy 
as essentially different from Western philosophy and 
in presenting it as a monolith with a single overriding 
character. The persisten{:c of Orientalist disc,ourse in 
c.ontemporary scholarship and its incidence even in the 
Arab world itself calls fclt a word of explanation. In 
the conclusion to Orientalism. Said writes that 'despite 
its failures ... Orientalism flouri shes today.'·37 He adds 
that, 'It is ". apparent, I think, that the circumstances 
making Orientalism a continuingly persuasive type 
of thought will persist: a rather depressing matter on 
the whole.':;' 
Said predicts the persistence of Orienta list discourse 
presumably because of the intransigence of the power 
relations that he identified as informing Orientalism 
in the first place. Despite the demise of colonialism 
of a traditional variety, the web of power relations 
that continues to govern the relationship between the 
West and the Middle East still largely reinforces and is 
reinforced by Orientalist discourse. The phenomenon 
can be glibly summed up in the slogan 'Knowledge 
is power.' But, rather than rest with this glib slogan, I 
want to suggest that there are in fact two readings of 
this phrase, which might be identified respectively with 
Francis Bacon and Michel Foucault. On the Baconian 
understanding of the slogan, knowledge is instrumental 
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in the projection of power, its perpetuation, and sus-
tenance; it both fceds and is fed by the exercise of 
power. However, 011 the Foucauldian view. there is no 
such thing as knowled.ge beyond what various systems 
of power disseminate as t.heir vision of reality. In my 
view, Said is more of a Baconian than a Foucauldian 
on this score. That is to say. he is interested in the way 
in which the acad.emics and the think-tanks conspire 
in the. project.ion of power .-. namely by misinterpret-
ing. misrepresenting, misinforming, and omitting what 
does not fit into their world-view. Despite his obvious 
debts to Foucault, Said generally sees power-laden 
discourse as a distort.ion of a fuller and more accurate 
picture. not just as one more assertion of a will to 
power, whose only possible response is another. As he 
puts it in the introduction to Orientalism: 
Perhaps the most important task. of all would be to 
undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to 
Orientalism. to ask how one can study other cul-
tures and peoples from a libertarian, or a nonrepres-
sive and nonmanipulative, perspective, But then one 
would have to rethink the \vhole complex problem 
of knowledge and power,-w 
At the end of the work, he explains that 'one way 
of opening oneself to what one studies in or about the 
Orient is reflexively to submit one's method to criti~ 
cal scrutiny.'40 Elsewhere, he has written that a 'full 
intellectual process' involves 'historically informed 
research, as well as the presentation of a coherent and 
carefully argued line that has taken account of altern a-
tives.'4! The possibility of non~coercivc interactions 
that lead to more nuanced, responsive and empathic 
interpretations is precisely what makes me think that 
Said docs not embrace the more nihilistic aspects of 
Foucault - and is what makes him hold out hope for 
more meaningful intellectual engagements between the 
West and the Middle East based on a more equitable 
power relationship, 
For the sake of completencss, I should add that 
some interpreters of Said have considered him to be 
propounding a kind of cultural relativism. Indeed, 
there is evidence in his work that may suggest as much. 
in 11 well-known passage in Orientalism he writes: 
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It is not the thesis of this book to suggest that there 
is such a thing asa real or twe Orient (ls'lam~ Arab, 
or what.ever) ... On the contrary, ] have been arguing 
that 'the Orient' is itself a constituted entity. and 
that the notion that there are geographical spaces 
with indigenous. radi(:aHy 'different' inhabitants 
who can be defined on the basis of some religion, 
(.'ulturc, or racial essence proper to that geographical 
space is equally a highly debatable idea. 42 
Yet rather than betraying a kind of simple-minded 
relativism, ( take this as an admission that no single 
account of 'the Orient' (or indeed of a subject as 
large as Islamic philosophy) could claim finality or 
comprehensiveness, That is not to suggest, howeveT. 
that there could not be better and worse accounts of 
such subjects as Islamic philosophy, Arabic calligraphy 
or Mamlnk architecture. What renders some accounts 
better than others is not a sitnple matter to determine, 
and is likely to be domain-specific. I have been arguing 
in this article that an account of [slamie philosophy 
that analyses its central arguments and interrogates 
them is superior to one that merely indicates the prov-
enance of its principal theories. Different standards 
and guidelines arc undoubtedly more suitable when it 
comes to different subject matters and disciplines. In 
all cases, the accounts that we consider to be accurate, 
perceptive, and marked by superior understanding are 
likely to be ones that are not warped by being in the 
service of hegemonic power or colonial domination. 
Finally, one migbt wonder why, given this expla-
nation f()r the persistence of Orientalism, which is. 
premissed on asymmet.ries of power, a species of 
Orientahsm finds its home in the writings of an Arab 
scholar, based in the Arab world, writing on Arab-
Islamic philosophy. I will conclude by suggesting that 
these very same power relations do not just infect 
scholarship in the West, but have repercussions for 
the way that Arab scholars view their own intellectual 
traditions. Many contemporary Arab intellectuals seem 
to feel the need to set up their own version of the 
enlightened West within Arab-Islamic history largely 
because of an overwhelming sense of defensiveness 
and inferiority vis-a.-vis the We,st. In addition, they 
sometimes seem wholJy fixated on their differences 
with political Islam and regard this as the pre-eminent 
confrontation of their time, distorting their own intel-
lectual traditions in order to fight this cultural war, 
at least partly because that is the confrontation that 
looms largest in the mind of the West. This is not an 
attempt to blame our own Orientalist discourse on the 
West. but rather a suggestion that the power relations 
that continue to define the West's relationship to the 
Middle East have a ripple effect that influences not just 
Western discourse but Arab discourse as welL 
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